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1 Introduction
The purpose of our paper is to examine the effect of mandatory retention and rotation
requirements on auditor’s independence. An experimental investigation is conducted and
some positive results are obtained so as to introduce these requirements. Moreover, we
make a comparison between investigating behavior of auditors who can reject manager’s
offer and those who cannot when the incumbent is dismissed. Increasing concern in Japan
is that big audit firms are reluctant to have an engagement with some risky clients, only
to make them impossible to find an auditor or a “refugee” status. More serious concern
arises to auditor independence of medium and small audit firms which cannot but accept
these clients.
After the Enron case in US, we have among others a window dressing and demolition
of Kanebo, a big textile and cosmetic company of very long tradition in Japan. Due to this
scandal, one of the biggest Japanese audit firms collapsed in 2006 after the arrest of impli-
cated auditors. The arrested auditors closed their eyes to the deliberate elimination of
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many companies that should have been otherwise consolidated. Further consideration of
strengthening auditor independence has been going on not only in US but also in Japan.
In particular the government oversight bodies in US seem to take great interest in intro-
ducing a mandatory rotation requirement as a means of enhancing auditor independence.
A questionnaire towards managers and CPAs has been conducted by GAO in US
(2003) and those who answered demonstrate their serious concern about efficiency of the
mandatory rotation, indicating that the costs outweigh the benefits. Another question-
naire is done by Japan Auditing Association (2006) based on that of GAO (2003). Those
who answered show their understanding about effectiveness on enhancing the indepen-
dence of auditors but show the same concern about cost efficiency. In addition, managers
in listed companies admit their exclusive choice from 4 big Japanese audit firms, ignoring
the existence of other medium and small audit firms.
Lu (2006) insists, based on his model, in the efficiency of corporate governance role of
capital market prices in disciplining excessive client pressure. Furthermore, he demon-
strates that mandatory auditor rotation may prevent outsiders from being accessible to a
valuable information source. In a free market auditors switch may be regarded as a signal
for possible opinion shopping and hence it could give outsiders an opportunity of reconsid-
ering their estimation of capital market prices. What he concerns is that mandatory rota-
tion may totally eliminate it and could provide a cover for opinion shopping and encourage
overstatement of financial positions of clients.
As Dopuch et al. (2001, p. 94) mentioned, it is difficult to obtain empirical evidence on
the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation prior to its implementation. However, the
rotation rule can be evaluated in countries that have adopted a mandatory audit firm
rotation policy. In Spain the rotation rule was effective from 1988 to 1995 and an appoint-
ment could last for no less than three and no longer than nine years.
Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence on the impact of mandatory
rotation on auditor independence, by comparing audit reporting behavior between the
mandatory rotation period (19911994) and the post-mandatory rotation period (1995
2000). They analyze the propensity to issue a going-concern opinion to distressed compa-
nies on the assumption that it is positively corrected with the level of auditor independ-
ence. Their analysis finds no significant association between the auditor’s level of
economic dependence and the likelihood of issuing a going-concern report in both periods.
Dopuch et al. (2001) uses experimental methods to investigate the potential benefits
gained from imposing mandatory rotation in an audit market. As they mentioned (2001,
p. 95), mandatory rotation may not necessarily improve auditor’s independence during the
periods prior to the rotation date since clients could threaten to replace their auditors
earlier than required. In addition to the rotation requirement, therefore, they also investi-
gate the effects of mandatory retention, which requires the clients to retain the incumbent
auditor for a pre-specified number of years.
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Their experiment consists of multi-period interaction between a manager who invest
in a risky asset and an auditor who issues a report about this asset. They assume an
exogenous audit technology in order to focus on the auditor’s reporting strategies. The
auditor’s reporting choice is made after observing a signal for the asset quality and learn-
ing the posterior probability that the asset quality is incorrect.
What they found is that the imposition of mandatory rotation decreased auditor’s
subjects’ willingness to bias their report in favor of management, relative to the free mar-
ket where neither mandatory rotation nor mandatory retention was imposed. The lowest
frequency of biased report occurred in the market where both retention and rotation were
mandatory. Their experiment supports the notion that mandatory rotation can increase
auditor’s independence.
As Dopuch et al. (2001, p. 94) mentioned, the experimental methods are one means of
conducting empirical studies of an issue when studies using archival data are almost
infeasible and they allow us to focus on the impact of mandatory rotation holding constant
market, legal, and other institutions that could constrain auditor’s willingness to compro-
mise their independence. Thus, we conduct another experimental examination about this
issue.
Our experimental settings are similar to that of Dopuch et al. (2001), but there are two
major changes. One is that we assume an endogenous audit technology so as to focus on
effort choices. This assumption is based on the tendency that the Japanese auditors delib-
erately avoid their investigations in order to close their eyes to doubtful accounts and
transactions and to issue a biased report, like the Kanebo scandal mentioned above. The
crucial importance is given to what Mautz and Sharaf (1961, p. 207) call investigative
independence1.
Another change is that we add a market in which some auditors can reject an offer
from managers while others cannot when the incumbent is fired. We simulate the Japa-
nese audit market in which some clients can find no auditor and get nowhere, only to
become a refugee because of their high audit risk. In other words, all big four audit firms
are reluctant to have an engagement with those who have a refugee status. Only small and
medium sized audit firms are willing to have an engagement with them and are running
the risk of compromising their independence.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. We present the experimental design in
the section 2 and illustrate the possible strategies of subjects and hence hypotheses in the
section 3. The results are indicated in the section 4. A summary and conclusion are pro-
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1 Our experimental settings specify lack of independence as auditors who deliberately fail in dis-
covering decisive evidence, in other words, deliberately discover only uninformative evidence,
but report in the favor of managers. The definition in the experiment of Dopuch and King (1991)
is almost same as ours. According to Lu (2006, p. 565), however, this is no issue of independence,
since he defines lack of independence as reporting in the favor of manager despite decisive evi-
dence which supports the contrary.
vided in the final section.
2 The Experimental Design
21 The Basic Setting
What 2 players, a manager and an auditor, concern is the quality of an asset. The
outcome of the quality can be high or low. At the beginning of each period the manager
decides to make an investment or not, after which his decision is made public. The
investment increases the probability of producing a high quality asset .
The manager hires an auditor to credibly communicate the asset quality. The auditor
is already aware of the historical value of asset, since the investment decision is made
public, but the faire value of asset, in other words, the asset quality is not sure. All he can
do is to make an effort or not. By choosing a costly effort he can employ a higher audit
technology of quality. That allows him to detect more often decisive evidence necessary
for determining the asset quality.
With probability ofhe succeeds in discovering decisive evidence that the asset qual-
ity is low. He should, thereby, state in his audit report that the asset quality is low .
No erroneous report is issued. With probability of he fails and without decisive
evidence he cannot issue report. He should, therefore, state that the asset quality is high
and could sometimes make a mistake.
An erroneous report is discovered at the end of period and the auditor pays a legal
penalty. The auditor report has also consequences for the manager’s compensation. A 
report results in a higher compensation for the manager than a  report. After observing
the auditor’s report, the manager chooses to retain the incumbent auditor for another
period, if rotation is not required, or to replace him if retention is not required. A manager
who dismisses an auditor incurs a setup cost for the new audit engagement.
Like Dopuch et al. (2001, p. 98), if the manager retains the auditor, the auditor receives
economic rents in every period of a repeat audit engagement. These rents can repre-
sent savings from declining marginal costs or synergies between audit and non-audit
services provided by the auditor. Since the receipt of these rents depends on the manager
rehiring the auditor, the manager could try to influence the auditor’s investigating strat-
egy by threatening to terminate an auditor who reports . On the assumption that all
economic rents are captured by the auditor for the purpose of increasing the credibility of
the manager’s dismissal threat, the auditor is vulnerable to a potential lack of independ-
ence.
Figure 1 shows the game tree of the interactions between managers and auditors and
Figure 2 summarizes their payoffs. Since our focus is on the extent to which rotation and
retention enhance auditor independence, created is an economic setting in which auditor-
subjects had an incentive to compromise independence. An auditor who issued a report
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could not be dismissed unless retention is required, thereby by guaranteeing a repeat audit
engagement and economic rents to an auditor who reports favorably. His hesitation in
issuing a report may lead him to choose no effort by deliberately avoiding the discovery
of decisive evidence, in which case happened very often in Japan so far.
22 The Procedures
5 different markets are created. In the market ① neither mandatory rotation nor
mandatory retention is required. The manager can choose either to dismiss or retain the
auditor at the end of any period. In the market② the manager must retain the auditor for
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Figure 2 Payoffs of Managers and Auditors
Payoffs
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Figure 1 Game Tree
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3 periods at least. The retention requirement provides a guarantee that the auditor can
earn at least 2 periods of rents by reducing the auditor’s incentive to compromise independ-
ence in these periods.
In the market ③ the manager can dismiss the auditor at the end of any period but
retain for no less than 3 periods, thereby, avoiding their collusion. In the market ④ the
auditor must be always rotated at an interval of 3 periods. In these periods no dismissal is
allowed and the manager should replace the auditor every 3 periods. The market ⑤ is
similar to the market ① , but some auditors can reject manager’s offer. Furthermore,
whether a manager invests in the asset or not is not public.
The subjects are all business major undergraduate and graduate students. They ini-
tially received instructions and experience both managers and auditors in all markets from
① to⑤. Unlike a random assignment of auditors at the experiment of Dopuch et al. (2001),
4 auditors are assigned to each market except for the market ⑤where 5 auditors are as-
signed and 3 auditors among them can reject manager’s offer. The manager who dismissed
the incumbent should choose a new auditor from the remaining auditors but can choose
later repeatedly the dismissed auditors. This setting is similar to the Japanese audit mar-
ket in which only 4 big audit firms are predominant.
The subjects are informed that the experiment would run for at least 20 periods, after
which it would continue with a half chance that any subsequent period is last. The session
has an uncertain end point so as to prevent the possible backwards induction. We illus-
trate the treatment which follows the sequence outlined here for each period.
 Each manager makes an investment (70 yen) or not (). If the investment
is made, the probability of a high quality asset increases from to .
 Whether the investment was made or not is disclosed.
 Each auditor chooses to make an effort or not in order to collect audit evidence.
If he doesn’t makes an effort (), he can discover decisive evidence that the
asset quality is low and states it in his audit report ( report) with probability of
2/3. On the other hands, if he does make an effort (20 yen), this probability
increases up to 7/8.
 The audit report is disclosed.
 The manager receives his payoff (300 yen), if the audit report is  and
(), if the audit report is .
 The auditor pays a legal penalty (210 yen), if he reports a low quality asset as
.
 The manager decides whether to dismiss the auditor or retain him, unless reten-
tion or rotation is required. Once a manager dismisses an auditor, 3 remaining
auditors are immediately informed that the manager has dismissed the auditor.
Every time he employs a new auditor, he incurs a set up cost for the initial period
of an audit engagement (	5 yen).
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 The auditor receives the rents (115 yen) in every period of a repeat audit
engagement with the same manager.
 If the manager dismisses the auditor, he must choose a new one from the 3 remain-
ing auditors.
3 The Strategies and Hypotheses
31 The Auditor’s Strategies
All auditor-subjects can do is to make a costly effort or not. The difference of these
choices is the likelihood of discovering decisive evidence, thereby, the frequency of issuing
 or  report, since they are supposed to issue a  report, whenever they may find no
decisive evidence that the asset quality is low.
The auditor weights the costs and benefits of each of the two report and choose an
effort or not so as to maximize his expected utility. The cost of making no effort is the
expected liability if the asset quality is low, and the benefit is the rent received through the
rehire of the manager. The benefit to the auditor from making an effort is the avoidance
of a potential liability, but the cost is the possibility of losing next period’s rent through the
dismissal of the manager and the cost of effort.
Using the Bayes’ rule, when the audit-subject issues a  report, we have the condi-
tional probability that the asset quality is low as follows,
The auditor-subject had better make an effort, if the next condition is satisfied, where
denotes the probability of discovering decisive evidence when he makes no effort, while
denotes the probability when he makes an effort.
Our prediction is that if the auditor-subject makes choices that maximize his expected
payoffs, an auditor not facing a mandatory retention or rotation requirement at the end of
the period will make no effort if the future rents exceed the expected liability costs. As
Figure 3 shows, our experimental setting gives him this incentive, if the manager is willing
to invest. However, the auditor will be worse off, if the manager is reluctant to invest.
The manager cannot threaten the auditor with dismissal in a retention period and his
rents are guaranteed. The auditor maximizes payoffs in a retention period by making an
effort, thus by increasing in reporting and by decreasing the liability risks. On the other
hand, if the replacement is inevitable because of an rotation rule, the auditor maximizes
payoffs by making an effort, knowing that rents cannot be received even if he reports .
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Like Dopuch et al. (2001, p. 102), implicit in this prediction is that auditors are willing to
choose no effort and hence report more frequently in periods when the manager can
dismiss them.
In the markets with no rotation requirement, auditors and managers can interact over
a long time horizon and the auditor could have higher expected benefits from cooperation
with a manager. Less effort can be, therefore, observable in the free market and the later
periods in the market with only a retention requirement. Hypothesis 1 sums up as follows.
Hypothesis 1
Auditors will compromise their independence most often in the free market and least
often in the market with both retention and rotation requirements. More specifically, the
frequency of effort is the lowest in the free market, followed by the market with only a
retention requirement, the market with only a rotation requirement, and the highest in the
market with both requirements.
32 The Manager’s Strategies
So as to induce the auditor to choose no effort, and thus to issue an  report more
frequently, which generates higher payoffs for the manager, the manager create a credible
threat of dismissal. As Dopuch et al. (2001, p. 103) mentioned, a replacement threat can be
credible only if it would be ex post rational for the manager to carry it out. The manager
is predicted to replace the auditor, if the set-up cost that will have to be incurred with the
new auditor, is lower than expected benefit from replacement. The expected benefit
derives from the manager forming a reputation for dismissing auditors who report .
The increase in the manager’s expected payoff is the difference between his payoff if
the auditor reports , and the payoff if the auditor reports . The manager
expects the auditor to choose no effort rather than to make an effort. The auditor reports
with probability , when he chooses no effort and he reports with probability
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Figure 3 Comparison between Auditor’s Estimations of a Legal Penalty and His
Expected Benefits (Y=210 yen, R=115yen, and e=10 yen)
Manager
(Investment) (No investment)
(Make an effort)
and 


 	

and 


 	

Auditor
(Make no effort)
and 


 	
and 


 	
, when he makes an effort. The increase in the probability of reporting
 is expected from a dismissal. Thereby, the increase in expected payoffs due to a credible
threat is as follows.
The manager’s replacement strategy is to replace an auditor who reports , if the
following condition is satisfied.
Given the experimental parameters, the setup costs of 5 yen are sufficiently low to a
credible replacement threat at all levels of .
Like Dopuch et al. (2001, p. 104), we hypothesize that managers will use dismissal and
investment as substitute. In periods that allow the managers to dismiss an auditor, manag-
ers are reluctant to make an investment and induce the auditor to make no effort and issue
a favorable report more frequently by creating a credible dismissal rate. In rotation or
retention periods, where dismissal by the manager is not allowed, managers are willing to
make an investment, which results in a higher probability of a high quality asset, thereby
increasing the probability of an  report and high payoffs. Hypothesis 2 sums it up.
Hypothesis 2
Managers use dismissal and investment as substitute. In the free market and the
market with only a rotation requirement, where dismissal is allowed, therefore, managers
will more often dismiss auditors reportingand make no investment. Managers will make
an investment more frequently in the markets with only a retention requirement and with
both retention and rotation requirements, where dismissal is not allowed.
Dopuch et al. (2001, p. 104) also demonstrate a competing hypothesis based on the
behavioral theory, since the markets with no rotation requirement allow for a longer hori-
zon over which the manager interacts with the same auditor. These markets may encour-
age reciprocity, in which market the manager is expected to make an investment more
frequently so as to reduce the auditor’s expected liability when the auditor chooses no
effort and try to report favorably. Hypothesis 3 sums it up.
Hypothesis 3
In the markets with no rotation requirement manager will dismiss less frequently and
invest more frequently.
Manager’s investment choice being private, we expect him to invest less frequently, in
other words, to behave in the manner of risky clients. As Magee and Tseng (1990) suggest,
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 
auditors who can reject manager’s offer, are not running the risk of compromising their
independence, while those who cannot are vulnerable to his threat and may try to report
favorably. Hypothesis 4 sums it up.
Hypothesis 4
Auditors who cannot reject manager’s offer make an effort less frequently.
4 The Results
Table 1 shows the standard deviation, the average, and the mean of frequency of in-
vestment, effort, and dismissal in each market. The comparison and the statistical analysis
are made across the markets. As Table 1 and 2 as well as Figure 5 shows, in accordance
with the 1st hypothesis the frequency of effort is the highest in the market ④ with both
retention and rotation requirements.
Contrary to our expectation, however, the frequency is the lowest in the market ②
with only a retention requirement, followed by the market③ with only a rotation require-
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Table 1 Standard Deviation, Average, and Mean of Frequency
of Investment, Effort, and Dismissal
Market ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
N 18 18 18 18 18
Frequency of Investment (％)
SD 15.16 8.01 10.01 8.66 13.42
Average 89.87 93.39 91.86 94.03 84.38
Mean 10.00 97.62 97.73 100.00 80.95
Frequency of Effort (％)
SD 22.53 26.78 27.35 21.14 21.85
Average 54.01 38.77 51.42 65.84 54.72
Mean 50.10 29.29 45.00 65.83 57.14
Frequency of Dismissal (％)
SD 5.96 7.16 4.16 1.62 7.36
Average 9.92 8.84 35.88 31.11 12.03
Mean 10.00 5.00 35.00 30.00 10.00
Digression Analysis
Coefficient between Frequency of Investment and Effort
0.1902 －0.2270 －0.1822 0.0617 －0.0095
Coefficient between Frequency of Effort and Dismissal
－0.1103 0.2092 0.1292 0.0295 0.1805
Coefficient between Frequency of Investment and Dismissal
－0.0275 －0.1436 －0.0956 －0.2324 －0.4537
ment and the free market ①. The ANOVA2 and Kruskal Wallis test indicate that the fre-
quency of effort is significantly different across the markets, as Table 2 shows. In order to
enhance auditor independence, thereby, a simple mandatory rotation requirement is not
sufficient but a mandatory retention is also necessary, unlike the findings of Dopuch et al.
(2001) which show the overdosed effect of simultaneous requirements.
As for the investment policy of managers, the 2nd hypothesis has week support, since
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Table 2 The Results of Man-Whitney’s Test, ANOVA, and Kruskal-Wallis Test
Investment Effort selection Dismissal
Market① and ②
Mann-Whitney’s Test  157 *215 186
Value  109  215  215 
Market① and ③
Mann-Whitney’s Test  162.5 173.5 ***0
Value  215  215  81 
Market① and ④
Mann-Whitney’s Test  151.5 *107 ***0
Value  109  109  81 
Market① and ⑤
Mann-Whitney’s Test  202 120 133.5
Value  215  109  109 
Market② and ③
Mann-Whitney’s Test  171 120 ***1.5
Value  215  109  81 
Market② and ④
Mann-Whitney’s Test  155 *105 ***6
Value  215  109  81 
Market③ and ④
Mann-Whitney’s Test  148.5 *105 ***274
Value  109  109  243 
Market①,②,③,and ④
ANONA  3.671
-Value  **0.0163
Kruskal-Wallis’s Test  0.2237 9.325 55.45
-Value  0.9737 **0.0251 ***0.0000
2 Types of Auditors of Market ⑤
Mann-Whitney’s Test  112
Value  82 
significantly different at 0.1 significantly different at 0.05
significantly different at 0.01
2 AVOVA cannot be applied to the frequency of investment and dismissal, because Bartlett test
shows a significant difference of standard deviation from the market ① to ④.
managers very often make an investment throughout 5 markets as Figure 4 shows. The
adverse coefficient between the frequency of investment and dismissal throughout 5 mar-
kets, particularly relatively high coefficient in the market ④ and market ⑤ with some
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auditors who can reject manager’s offer, supports partly this hypothesis.
As far as the frequency of dismissal is concerned, however, the 3rd hypothesis has
strong support, since the frequency of dismissal is much lower in the market① and② than
in the market③ and④, as Figure 6 shows. In the market③ the frequency is obviously the
highest. The lowest frequency occurs in the market②, while the frequency of effort is also
the lowest. The tendency of dismissal in the market⑤ is almost the same as in the market
① and ②.
The 4th hypothesis has very week support, since the only average frequency of effort
is higher among auditors who cannot reject manager’s offer than those who can in the
market ⑤ but there is no significant difference. The problem is that out experiments
always stars with an auditor who can reject manager’s offer. We should have separated
the number of his effort from that of others and calculated the frequency. However, even
if this precaution had been done, the results should not have changed dramatically, be-
cause the frequency of effort, investment, and dismissal shows no significant difference
between the market ① and ⑤.
5 Concluding Remarks
The summary of our findings is as follows.
 Both mandatory rotation and retention requirements are necessary so as to im-
prove auditor independence.
 A simple retention requirement leads managers and auditors to produce their
reciprocity and decrease auditor independence.
 The frequency of effort selection among auditors who can reject manager’s offer
is just smaller than those who cannot, but there is no significant difference. So
much to a relief that great concern about lack of independence of medium and
small audit firms is not justified so far.
Some of our experimental designs should be reconsidered. First of all, the cost of
investment seems to be too small. Thus, managers make an investment so frequently that
the overall results cannot be evaluated correctly. Secondly, our experimental settings in
the last market, making manager’s investment choice private and distinguishing the role
of auditors from big audit firms to others based on a simple veto power when the incum-
bent is dismissed, couldn’t produce enough the reality of problems in Japan. Together with
technical problems of data collection, much improvement should be done for our next
experimental investigation.
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Appendix
Information and Instruction
General Information
You have been given the opportunity to participate in a study. The purpose of the
study is to expand the knowledge of economic decision making. You have the opportunity
to earn the money in an experiment.
Information about the Experiment
You will now participate in an experiment. 5 laboratory markets are created. Each
manager can make an investment in an asset throughout 5 markets. This investment is
public from the market① to④, but it is not public in the market⑤. By making no invest-
ment in the asset, each manager can produce a high quality asset with probability 1/5, but
he can improve this probability up to 4/5 by making an investment at the cost of 70 yen.
Each auditor has to audit the quality of this asset and his audit report is published at once,
stating that the asset quality is low or high. The audit report is always correct, when it
states that the asset quality is low, but sometimes an incorrect audit report will be issued
when it states that the asset quality is high and a legal penalty of 210 yen is imposed on the
auditor.
Each auditor can make an effort at the cost of 10 yen so as to improve the probability
of detecting decisive evidence. He is supposed to issue a correct report, as far as he can
discover decisive evidence for the low quality. However, if he fails in finding it, he should
issue an audit report, always stating that the asset quality is high. If he doesn’t make an
effort, the probability of detecting decisive evidence remains 2/3. He is, therefore, more
likely to issue an audit report stating that the asset quality is high. If he does make an
effort, however, the probability increases to 7/8 and he is less likely to issue an audit report
stating that the asset quality is high.
Each manager has a payoff of 300 yen, if the audit report states that the asset quality
is high, while he doesn’t have anything, if the report states that the quality is low. In the
latter case he should decide to dismiss his auditor or not. The dismissal of the incumbent
costs him 5 yen in order to prepare for the engagement of a new auditor. Except for the
market ⑤, 3 auditors remain to be hired. The manager can choose one of them freely but
they know he dismissed his auditor. In the market ⑤, however, 3 auditors can reject ma-
nager’s offer, while 2 other auditors cannot when the dismissal occurs. The auditor has a
payoff of 115 yen, whenever he is not dismissed at the end of period, while he receives
nothing every time his dismissal occurs.
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In the market ② the manager must retain the auditor for 3 periods at least. In the
market ③ the manager can dismiss the auditor at the end of any period but retain for no
less than 3 periods. In the market ④ the auditor must be always rotated at an interval of
3 periods. In these periods no dismissal is allowed and the manager should replace the
auditor every 3 periods.
Finally your actual pay is half of payoffs that you have received at every round re-
gardless of your role.
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